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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this thesis is to explore the legality, the issues, and the remedy to a 
controversial statute in the State of Illinois. This thesis will explain how the First Amendment 
relates to the Illinois statute and its desire of a citizen is right to report information that is not 
being granted. Moreover, this paper will further go into a recent legislative bill to amend the 
Illinois statute, its failure, the media surrounding the issue, and the consequences of amending or 
not amending the statute. It will further review state law in regard to citizens recording police 
officers, and explain how some states deal with the statute.  
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Introduction 
 
 The term “surveillance” is commonly associated as the act to closely observe another 
person or location. In most cases, it is instantly perceived as a positive action in order to maintain 
order in a specific place or local.   However, many citizens do not think that sometimes recording 
can not only be illegal, it can also put them in prison for a very long time. 
 The first eavesdropping and wiretapping law in Illinois was passed in 1895, it was then 
amended in the Criminal Code of 1961. However, despite the laws in regards to eavesdropping 
and wiretapping being over one hundred years old, there are still many questions that remain 
whether concerning their applicability in criminal trials and civil trials. After reading this 
research paper, the reader will understand the legal concepts, issues, and consequences 
surrounding the wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes in regards to citizens recording police 
officers in all states. Moreover, it will also provide a deep understanding of the history of how 
the statutes were first introduced and how they changed, when they changed, and how they 
changed with a specific focus on Illinois due to Illinois being the most controversial. The reader 
will also understand the consequence of public policy and public response to on-going changes 
of the law in that area. Readers will also be able to provide a deep understanding of how the First 
Amendment works, and how it protects its citizens. 
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I. History 
A. The Federal Wiretap Act 
The Federal Wiretap Act was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.
1
 Congress enacted the act as an attempt to construct a balance between law 
enforcement and privacy rights,
2
 as that used to be a rising concern at the time.
3
 
The Federal Wiretap Act under subsection four states the following: “intercept means the 
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through 
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” This means that any intentional 
interception of any type of communication can have a punishment of up to five years in prison, 
unless an exception can be found. There are many exceptions that can be found in the Act; 
however, one of the most noteworthy is the one-party consent exception. Among many 
exceptions, one of the most interesting ones is that if one of the parties gives consent, that is 
enough in itself to allow the recording to happen without violating the Federal Wiretap Act.
4
 
Another exception is that a face-to-face conversation is permitted as an oral communication only 
if there is an expectation of privacy that is reasonable. 
5
 
                                                             
1
 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Federal Wiretap Act) of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 
197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2510-22 (2006). 
2
 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972). “[The Federal Wiretap Act] has its dual purpose (1) protecting 
the privacy of wire and oral communications, and. (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and 
conditions under which the interception of...communications may be authorized.” Id. 
3
 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) “There is...a deep-seated 
uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding 
citizens.” Id. 
4
 Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) provides: “It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of 
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one 
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” 
5 Id.  
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B. States’ Party Consent and the Differences for the Federal Wiretap Act 
As of today, there are forty-nine states that have wiretapping statutes that are similar to 
the Federal Wiretap Act, Vermont being the only state that does not have any statute in regards to 
anti-wiretapping. The main idea behind these wiretapping statutes, much like the Federal Wiretap 
Act, is to mirror its predecessor in a way to help combat crime. But it is also focused on 
attempting to protect individuals’ privacy rights.6 Thirty-nine of the states have the same one-
party consent exception as the Federal Wiretap Act does, while eleven of those states have what is 
called the all-party or two party consent requirement. The states can be appropriately divided in 
the two categories: 
One Party Consent States: 
                                                             
6
  An example is: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §99(A) (2008) which provides: 
“The general court finds that organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that 
the increasing activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public 
welfare and safety... because organized crime carries on its activities through layers of 
insulation and behind a wall of secrecy, government has been unsuccessful in curtailing 
and eliminating it. Normal investigative procedures are not effective in the investigation 
of illegal acts committed by organized crime. Therefore, law enforcement officials must 
be permitted to use modern methods of electronic surveillance, under strict judicial 
supervision, when investigating these organized criminal activities. The general court 
further finds that the uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of modern electronic 
surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the 
commonwealth. Therefore, the secret use of such devices by private individuals must be 
prohibited.” 
Alabama Louisiana Oregon 
Alaska Maine Ohio 
Arizona Minnesota Rhode Island 
Arkansas Mississippi South Carolina 
Colorado Missouri South Dakota 
District of Columbia Nebraska Tennessee 
Georgia Nevada Texas 
Hawaii New Jeresey Utah 
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Two or All Party Consent States: 
California Massachusetts New Hampshire 
Connecticut Maryland Pennsylvania 
Delaware Michigan Washington 
Florida Montana 
 
 
  
Figure - 1 
A typical example of an all-party or two-party consent is that of Pennsylvania, there the 
statute reads the following: “shall not be unlawful…for a… person, to intercept a wire, electronic 
Idaho New Mexico Vermont 
Illinois New York Virginia 
Indiana North Carolina West Virginia 
Iowa North Dakota Wisconsin 
Kansas Oklahoma Wyoming 
Kentucky 
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or oral communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such 
interception.”7  Pennsylvania does have an expectation of privacy provision as does the federal 
statute. 
C. Illinois and Massachusetts  
Among the all-party consent states, there are two that are exceptionally strict compared to 
the others in our nation. The Massachusetts Wiretap Act
8
 and the Illinois Eavesdropping Act. 
They both, unlike all the other nine all-party consent states, lack the reasonable expectation of 
privacy provision. The reasonable expectation of privacy provision protects a face-to-face 
against any recording so long as a party has an expectation of privacy that society would 
consider reasonable. Illinois and Massachusetts prohibit the recording of a private or non-private 
conversation without consent of all parties. Illinois is austere in that it bans all recording without 
consent of all parties. In Illinois, recording a police officer is a class 1 felony that can be 
punishable by as much as fifteen years in prison.
9
 On the other hand, Massachusetts is a bit less 
severe, as it only prohibits recording made secretly.  
1. One Attempt to Change Illinois Statute 
In Illinois, December 29, 2011, Representative Elaine Nekritz filed with the clerk an 
amendment to the Criminal Code of 1961 to attempt to remove the characterization of recording 
police officers who are performing their public duties, in a public place as a criminal act. The bill 
was first read into the House Committee on January 1
st
, 2012, then a second reading and short 
                                                             
7
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5704(4) (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session).  
8 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 §99(B)(4). 
9 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/14-2.  
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debate took place on February 21
st
, 2012, and finally a third reading and debate were held in 
March 21
st
, 2012, where the bill finally lost.
10
 The bill received 45 yeas and 59 nays.
11
 A bill that 
fails to pass by failing its third reading is “killed,” meaning that it will not be pursued anymore. 
However, that is not to say that, despite its failure, the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute will not be 
changed in the near future. The proposed amendment was the following: 
(q) A person who is not a law enforcement officer nor acting at the direction of a law 
enforcement officer may record the conversation of a law enforcement officer who is 
performing a public duty in a public place and any other person who is having a 
conversation with that law enforcement officer if the conversation is at a volume 
audible to the unassisted ear of the person who is making the recording. For purposes 
of this subsection (q), "public place" means any place to which the public has access 
and includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, and highways (including 
inside motor vehicles), and the common areas of public and private facilities and 
buildings.
12
 
This amendment did propose a good way to facilitate a citizen to have the right to exercise his 
First Amendment right to record a police officer.  
During the debate, the side attempting to pass the bill argued that the Illinois statute was 
unconstitutional and that there was a movement to change it.
13
 Furthermore, the bill’s proponents 
                                                             
10
 Illinois Legislation House Bill 3944, 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/97/house/09700HB3944_03212012_017000T.pdf 
11
 Id.  
12
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=09700HB3944ham001&GA=97&LegID=62774&SessionId=
84&SpecSess=0&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=3944&GAID=11&Session=. 
13 Audio Recording from Illinois House Bill 3944 Debate, 2012. 
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explained how the ongoing advances in technology made the statute outdated and how it was too 
broad. The other side, however, argued that it was best to wait for the United States Supreme 
Court to review ACLU v. Alvarez, so that a higher authority could decide on what was 
constitutional and what was not.
14
 The Supreme Court chose not to hear the case, and, therefore, 
the lower court’s decision stands.  
2. Massachusetts Unusual Requirement 
Unlike the majority of other states, the Massachusetts Wiretap Act does not protect a 
conversation made with a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, only “surreptitious 
recording” is prohibited. The way the requirement works is that if a recording is made in open 
view, then there is no liability because it shows that there is implied knowledge of a recording 
taking place. When recording police in a surreptitious way, one can expect to be liable under the 
act. A good example is Graber,
15
 as Graber “did not tell the Troopers he was recording the 
encounter nor did he seek their permission to do so.” While this may seem like a technicality, 
that is the difference between an arrest and a lawful recording of an incident in Massachusetts.  
 While this requirement of having the recording out in plain view does seem to fix the 
problem of expectation of privacy, there can be cases where the subject who is being recorded, 
even though the recording is in plain view, may not notice that he is in fact being recorded in a 
conversation or interaction. The requirement does not actually require consent. There is a 
difference between presuming that the party is aware of the recording and, therefore, assumes 
that he is aware that his privacy has diminished, as opposed to a recording that he has given 
                                                             
14 Id.  
15
 Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-k-10-647 (Md. Cir. Ct., Harford Cnty., Sept. 27, 2010) 
12 
 
consent to and is aware for a fact that he no longer has privacy. In Glik,
16
 we see that the court 
sees that any device known to record audio is on its own enough to show the subject’s actual 
knowledge of the recording. Massachusetts’ unusual provision tends to be quite different than 
attempting to say that there is a provision that functions the same way as the exception noted by 
other states of reasonable expectation of privacy. There are plenty of scenarios where one could 
have a recording in open view, yet the subject has not actually seen or realized that his 
expectation of privacy is diminished because of it. Moreover, recent changes in technology 
could also pose a problem to the Massachusetts Wiretap statute. Because smartphones have 
several different functions, such as text messaging, mobile web, and more, it may be 
problematic for an individual to know that his expectation of privacy has been diminished 
because there is a smartphone in his presence and that he could be recorded. Other situations 
that could lead to a problem with this provision in Massachusetts are shown through Glik,
17
 
where Glik was recording a police officer in a public place where the police officer had no 
expectation of privacy, but Glik was arrested nonetheless for recording in a way that was 
considered surreptitious. Courts in Massachusetts because of this requirement will often have to 
ask the question of whether a recording was made in secret or not, and that will be the 
difference between a lawful recording and an unlawful one. Ultimately, this provision leads to a 
limit being set as to what the First Amendment right to gather and report information imposes. 
                                                             
16 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) 
17 Id. 
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D. Right to Privacy and Katz 
Most if not all Americans are familiar with their right to privacy. However, when 
searching in the Constitution for the word “privacy,” one will soon notice that it cannot be 
found anywhere.
18
 When issues of privacy first emerged, it was noted that while the word 
“privacy” was not in the Constitution; when reading the Constitution as a whole, you could 
understand that the notion of privacy, while not in words, was there in theory and function.
19
 
It has been clear that the drafters of the Constitution were always looking for citizens to have 
a right to privacy when looking at the Amendments as a whole. 
1. Katz v. United States 
The first case to emerge that dealt with the right to privacy was Katz.
20
 Surprisingly at the 
time, it was held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone booth 
conversations.
21
 The Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment “protects people 
not places”22 and that decision led to the overturn of Olmstead.23 In Olmstead, the court held 
that based on the language of the Fourth Amendment, police tapping telephone wires was not 
considered a search or seizure.
24
 This rationale demonstrated that citizens at the time lack 
expectation of privacy. With Katz, a modern test developed to evaluate if someone was or 
would violate a citizen’s right. The test was divided into a two-pronged approach25 the first 
                                                             
18 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1, 2 (2008). 
19 Id. 
20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
21 Id. 
22
 Id. at 353. 
23
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-70 (1928). 
24
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354(1967). 
25
 Id. at 360-63. 
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prong was that the person alleging the violation must have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
It is easier to understand this approach after looking at Smith,
26
 where the court held that there 
was no expectation of privacy when a police officer used a pen to capture numbers dialed into 
a telephone. The second prong was that the expectation of privacy must be one that society is 
willing to consider objectively reasonable. Again, looking at Smith
27
 will provide a better 
understanding of this concept. In Smith the court held that it would be unreasonable for the 
person taping the call to have an expectation of privacy in the number called because the 
dialed numbers are transmitted to the phone company when a call is connected. 
E. First Amendment Right to Receive Information 
The First Amendment provides several rights, one of them being free speech. However, 
there cannot be free speech if it is impossible to gather or receive the information. If one 
cannot access the speech, that speech is not free at all, at least that is the reasoning that the 
United States Supreme Court developed in Martin v. Struthers
28
 where it developed a theory 
that there was in fact a constitutional right under the First Amendment to receive information 
using the noted reasoning above.  
The right to receive information has gone through a lot of changes in the past, and 
expanded its use to something that was once considered peripheral and much less secure to 
something much broader. In the past, a common dispute was whether one was allowed to 
receive information in a library setting. Board of Education v. Pico
29
 was the first Supreme 
                                                             
26
 Smith v. Maryland - 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). 
27
 Id. at 742. 
28
 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
29
 Board of Education v. Pico, 57 U.S. 853 (1982). 
15 
 
Court case to consider it a necessary right to receive the information under the First 
Amendment. However, because the Justices were unable to reach a direct and common 
consensus, the divided opinions left a fractured jurisprudence. 
While Pico was a case about school books, it also was a base for later cases on issues of 
receiving information. The case involved a school board’s removal of a book from a public 
school library. Justice Brennan wrote at the time, “courts should not intervene in the resolution 
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems unless basic constitutional 
values are directly and sharply implicated.”30 However, the right to receive information did 
implicate the students’ right under the First Amendment. 
The court further reasoned that, “the right to receive information is an inherent corollary 
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, in two 
senses. First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment 
right to send them.” Furthermore, the Justice concluded and I quote, “the right to receive ideas 
is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, 
press, and political freedom.”31 The same principle could be applied to videos, recordings, or 
both. While it is true that the principle of receiving ideas started off with just books, this has 
evolved so much to the point where the ACLU is argument depended on the notion of 
receiving information, in that case, of a police officer, to be a right protected under the First 
Amendment. 
                                                             
30
 Id. at 856. 
31
 Id. at 867. 
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F. Cases Exploring the Issues with Some All-Party Consent States 
There have been quite a few cases that have challenged the all-party states wiretapping laws 
with regards to citizens recording police officers. Most of the cases, the issue most attorneys 
pressed was that the statute violates the First Amendment. The argument they make is that as an 
individual, you are allowed to record police officers acting in their official capacities.
32
 Citizens 
are often arrested subsequently after recording police officers; the following cases will illustrate 
how statutory language facilitated their arrest. They will also show the need for having an 
exception such as the one provided in the Federal Wiretap Act. 
1. Glik v. Cunniffe33 
Simon Glik was walking through Boston on an evening in October 1
st
, 2009. As he walked 
down the streets he noticed three police officers arresting a man. As Glik was passing by, he 
heard another person saying “You are hurting him, stop.”34 As soon as Glik heard the man, he 
took out his cell phone and started recording the encounter, standing about ten feet away.  After 
the police officer placed the subject in handcuffs, one of them turned to Glik and stated, “I think 
you have taken enough pictures.” In response, Glik said that he was recording audio as well, and 
that is when he was immediately placed under arrest. Glik was then taken to the police station, 
without knowing what he had done wrong; later he found out that he was being charged with 
violating the Massachusetts Wiretap Act
35
 and also charged with disturbing the peace and aiding 
                                                             
32 Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “The First Amendment protects the right to 
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of 
public interest.” Id. 
33
 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
34 Id.  
35 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272 §99(C)(1) (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session). 
17 
 
the escape of a prisoner. His cell phone and computer flash drive were then held as evidence. 
The Boston Municipal Court dismissed two of the counts, and dropped the charge of aiding in 
escape before trial. The court noted that there was no probable cause and that the officers were 
simply unhappy that they were being recorded by Glik.
 36
 Glik then filed a complaint against the 
arresting officer and the City of Boston, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment 
rights.
37
 
 The First Circuit held in regards to his First Amendment claim, that there was a right to 
film government officials as long as they were doing their duties in a public place; this included 
police officers doing their job.
38
 As the court reasoned, “First Amendment protects the right to 
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to 
record matters of public interest.”39 The court addressed some of the factors that have to be taken 
into account as to any First Amendment issue, the place, time, and manner. Glik’s recording was 
clearly protected by his constitutional right, as it was a recording in a public park and that he was 
also acting in a peaceful manner.  
 As to his Fourth Amendment claim, the court reasoned that there was a lack of probable 
cause for placing Glik under arrest. The court upon review of Massachusetts’ Wiretap Act, also 
noted that “conduct fell plainly outside the type of clandestine recording targeted by the wiretap 
statute” because Glik had his phone out, and was recording in a way that was open and non-
secretive. The police officers attempted to argue how having the cell-phone out was different 
than having a tape recorder, and that, because a cell-phone can have multiple functions, they 
                                                             
36 Daniel Rowinski, POLICE FIGHT CELLPHONE RECORDINGS, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010 at 12.  
37 655 F.3d at 79. 
38 Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir., 2000). 
39 Id. 
18 
 
were unable to know that it was in fact recording. The court, however, did not agree with the 
police officer’s argument and said that the other functions of the phone were irrelevant as to 
whether the recording was being made secretly as is required to be in violation of the 
Massachusetts Wiretap Act.
40
 That reasoning was the same as it was previously seen under 
Commonwealth v. Hyde. 
41
 In that case, the court explained that a recording is not secret if the 
instrument or device for the recording is held in plain sight. 
2. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle42 
In Pennsylvania 2007, Brian Kelly took a ride from a pick-up truck driver. As they were 
driving, a police officer stopped them for a traffic stop. As the police officer approached their 
vehicle, Kelly took out his video camera and put it in his lap set to record the encounter. As the 
officer was about to leave, he noticed Kelly’s video camera recording him.43 The police officer 
went on to place him under arrest under the assumption that he had violated the Pennsylvania 
Wiretapping Act and Electronic Surveillance Control Act,
44
 a felony in third degree that can be 
punishable to up to seven years in prison. As bail was set for $2,500, and that was too much for 
Kelly, so stayed locked in jail for twenty-seven hours; after that he was released thanks to his 
Mother for putting her house up as a security deposit.
45
 
 Charges against Kelly were dropped a month after, and it was then noted that the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act might have to be reviewed for possible amendments. As District 
Attorney David Freed stated himself, “When police are audio-and video-recording traffic stops 
                                                             
40 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 §99(B)(4) 
41
 Commonwealth v. Hyde  750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001) 
42 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). 
43 Id. 
44
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5704 (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session).. 
45 Matt Miller, WIRETAP CHARGE DROPPED IN POLICE VIDEO CASE, THE PATRIOT NEWS, June 21, 2007, at 23. 
19 
 
without notice to the subjects, similar actions by citizens, even if done in secret, will not result 
in criminal charges. I intend to communicate this decision to all police agencies so that officers 
on the street are better-prepared to handle a similar situation should it arise again.” And when 
asked about the wiretap statute as to what he thought about it, he responded, “It is not the 
clearest statute that we have on the books, it could need a look, based on how technology has 
advanced since it was written.”46 After Kelly was released, he filed a complaint against the 
Borough of Carlisle under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His argument was not surprisingly based on a 
violation of his First Amendment rights.
47
 However, this case was set before Glik, and the court 
ruled differently. It granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer, and found that 
videotaping a police officer was not a clearly established right under the First Amendment, at 
least not on those facts. The court reminded Kelly that the facts in this case, were based on a 
traffic stop, which can be “an inherently dangerous situation,” and because the First 
Amendment right is dependent on time, place, and manner restrictions, the right to record was 
not absolute. Therefore, the court granted the officers qualified immunity and Kelly’s case was 
then dismissed. 
3. Maryland v. Graber48 
In Maryland on March 2010, a man named Graber was riding his motorcycle on the 
highway, as he was stopped by a police officer in an unmarked vehicle.
49
 The police officer was 
not wearing his uniform, and his vehicle was a normal sedan; however, as he exited the vehicle, 
he pulled out his gun and yelled at Graber to get off his bike. He was going to cite Graber for 
                                                             
46 Id. 
47
 622 F.3d at 251. 
48 Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-k-10-647 (Md. Cir. Ct., Harford Cnty., Sept. 27, 2010). 
49 Id. 
20 
 
speeding and reckless driving, but during the stop, Graber’s helmet camera, one he uses usually 
record him riding, was also recording this whole encounter.
50
 A video was posted a week after 
on YouTube, with the whole footage of the encounter. A month after the video was posted, six 
police officers went to Graber’s house where, with a search warrant, they searched Graber’s 
parents’ house for 90 minutes; there they confiscated four computers, the camera helmet, 
external hard drives and thumb drives.
51
 Shortly after taking the noted items, Graber was placed 
under arrest, and was in jail for twenty-six hours. He was charged with violating the Maryland 
Wiretap Act, a felony punishable by up to five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both.
52
  Soon 
after he was released, Graber’s motion to dismiss was granted after the court reasoned that 
Graber’s conversation with the police officer they had no reasonable expectation of privacy, 
therefore; the recording did not violate the Maryland Wiretap Act.  
 
4. Smith  v. City of Cumming53 
James Smith filed a suit against the City of Cumming, Georgia alleging that the City 
police officer had harassed the Smiths, which suit also included a claim that Mr. Smith had not 
been able to videotape the police officer in violation of Smith’s First Amendment rights.54 The 
court reasoned that it did agree that Smith did have a First Amendment right to videotape police 
conduct as long as reasonable time, manner and place restrictions did apply, and especially the 
right to do so if the recording would be a matter of public interest. While it was true that the 
Smiths did have the right to record the police officers, they still had to prove that they were 
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deprived of such a right. And though, the Smiths did have the right to videotape them, the court 
could not find enough evidence to find that they were deprived of their right to record the police 
officer in their encounter. 
5. Robinson v. Fetterman55 
In Pennsylvania on June 20, 2000, Robinson was driving by Route 41 when he saw state 
troopers conducting truck inspections. He believed at the time that the manner in which those 
inspections were made was not safe. Because of this belief, Robinson gained authorization 
from a landowner on the northbound side of Route 41 to be able to videotape inspections done 
by state troopers. From that point on, Robinson began to videotape inspections, one of which 
was of officer Fetterman and Rigney from roughly 30 feet away. Officers Fetterman and 
Rigney noticed the recording, and placed Robinson under arrest for harassment.
56
  On August 
28, 2000, Robinson was then convicted of harassment, had to pay a fine, and was told to not go 
near the state troopers while they were performing their duties.  
Two years passed by and Robinson’s wife as she was driving on Route 41 almost got into 
an accident, mostly due to the congestion of the state troopers’ placement of the truck 
inspection. Robinson immediately thought the state troopers were conducting these inspections 
in an unsafe manner, and, because of that, he decided to videotape them. He gained the 
permission of a farm owner to conduct his recordings, in which he positioned himself about 20 
to 30 feet away from the highway. Later that day, as a state trooper was inspecting a truck, he 
noticed Robinson, and asked him for identification and if he had the permission from the 
owner to record roadway police officer; Robinson affirmed, and the state trooper continued to 
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do his duty. That same state trooper then advised his fellow trooper, Fetterman, about 
Robinson’s conduct, and Fetterman remembered Robinson from the past case where Robinson 
was convicted of harassment.
57
   
 Later on that same day, Fetterman, Rigney, and the other state trooper entered the farm 
where Robinson was videotaping the road, and asked him to stop videotaping them, and to leave 
the area. After Robinson refused to leave or stop videotaping, he was then placed under arrest. 
He was again charged with harassment
58
 but had his video-camera returned to him by the time he 
received his citation.
59
 He was later found guilty again of harassment; however, this time he 
appealed the conviction, alleging a violation of his right to free speech under the First 
Amendment, pointing out specifically, his right to “videotape state troopers and thus speak out 
on issues of public concern.”60 The court reasoned that indeed there was a right under the First 
Amendment to record the state troopers, as he was doing so to make a visual record of what he 
believed to be an unsafe manner in which they were performing their duties. The court ruled that 
there is a free speech right to record police officers while they perform their duties.
61
 
6. Illinois v. Allison62 
Allison was openly recording a police officer on his own property, when he was arrested 
for violating the Illinois Wiretap Act.
63
 After that, he was then recording his hearing at the 
Crawford County Courthouse, where he answered Judge Harrell’s question as to whether he had 
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a pocket recorder at his hearing, Judge Harrell then told him that “violated her right to 
privacy.”64 Allison was then charged with five counts of wiretapping, each punishable by four to 
15 years in prison. Two months later, Allison filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of probable 
cause.
65
 However, Allison, instead of focusing on his charges, concentrated specifically on the 
Illinois Wiretap Act, unlike past cases.
66
 The motion focused on the following arguments: 
vagueness, due process, and the First Amendment. The court did grant Allison’s motion to 
dismiss, in which Judge Frankland held for the first time that the Illinois Act did violate the 
First Amendment as it stood as flawed by lack of exceptions and served as a blanket rule as it 
had no limitations as required by the First Amendment such as time, place, or manner. The 
court grant Allison is motion to dismiss.
67
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7. ACLU v. Alvarez68 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed this complaint against Anita Alvarez 
in her official capacity as Cook County state’s attorney. The ACLU was seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief as to the application of the Illinois Wiretap Act.
69
 Its motion was dismissed 
by the district court, and the ACLU then filed an appeal, arguing the First Amendment provided 
protection to speech regarding government officials and matters of public concern. 
In September 2011, oral arguments were held in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Illinois. Judge Posner expressed his concern that when recordings are allowed, there will be “a 
lot more snooping around by reporters and bloggers,”70 pointing out as that being a bad thing 
because it would conflict with their privacy. However, it seems that argument was made with no 
basis in logic, because police-on-civilian audio recording does not undermine privacy, but 
civilian-on-police audio recording would.  
 Several months later, on May 8, 2012, the court reached a decision, finding that the 
Illinois Wiretapping Act did violate the First Amendment, and granted a preliminary injunction 
blocking the enforcement of the statute as applied to civilians on police officers recordings.
71
 
The court reasoned that the wording of the statute as too broad, as it did not include a provision 
for a reasonable expectation of privacy under statute.  
 On November 26, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving in place the 
appellate court’s injunction against the use of the statute prohibiting civilian recording of police. 
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Thus it, clearly decided that the First Amendment does protect an individual’s is right to openly 
record a police officer.
72
 
G. Lower Expectation of Privacy 
Unlike other American citizens, courts have often found that police officers have a lower 
expectation of privacy. For example, in O’Brian,73 the court concluded that it was mandatory 
for the officer to disclose financial records did not violate the police officer’s privacy right, 
because police officers are held to a higher standard of accountability and, because of that, a 
lessened privacy expectation.
74
 
Another concept that also impacts a police officer’s expectation of privacy is the open 
field doctrine. Basically, the doctrine is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy if 
something is left in view of the public, or exposed to the public.
75
 If police officers’ conduct 
their duties exposed to the public, some courts have interestingly thought that officers have 
lower expectation of privacy.
76
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II. Analysis 
A. Police Misconduct 
 One of the most critical reasons to amend the statute is so citizens could have a way to 
check if police officers are acting properly. Citizens have not forgotten the incident with Rodney 
King. On March 2nd, 1991, Rodney King and two other passengers were in a vehicle driving off 
Foothill Interstate. Rodney King, the driver at the time, was speeding at about 110 mph. Police 
officers started to chase his vehicle until he decided to stop. The police officers then, started to 
beat Rodney King for about fifteen minutes; meanwhile they were being secretly recorded by a 
citizen.
77
 These are fifteen minutes that may have never been known, if not for a citizen’s 
recording of the police officers. It will be long before citizens forget those recordings, and the 
prohibition against being able to record police officers could lead citizens to feel as if more 
events such as the involving Rodney King could go unnoticed.  
B. Support For Illinois’ Statute 
Despite its controversy, there is support for the statute. Some police officers believe the 
statute allows them to perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently. Others believe the 
contrary. Sheriff Bennie Vick of Williamson County Illinois articulated, “Someone coming up 
shoving a camera in your face...I can see how that would endanger lives.”78 Others argue that 
informants could be facing higher risks if a citizen decided to record an interaction between an 
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undercover police officer and the informant and that video was later to be found on YouTube. 
As such, it could cause a police investigation to fail when the investigation is exposed 
prematurely. While certainly there are many risks, there are also numerous reasons why the 
Illinois statute should be amended. 
C. Civilian Use of New Technology 
 We have come a long way from the old cellphone that used look like a brick, to the new 
generation smart phone, a computer in your pocket. Not surprisingly, smart phones can record 
videos and take pictures, and the power of a citizen to record anything, at any time can lead 
citizen to be his or her own news reporter. Those recordings can now be easily accessed through 
social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.
79
 It is estimated that 90 
percent of cellphones in the United States have a cellphone that accesses the Web.
80
 The use of 
smart phones and other digital cameras has been growing at a very quick rate. In 2009, 78 
percent of U.S. households owned a digital camera.
81
 Not only are most households with digital 
cameras; more than a billion cellphones are equipped with cameras.
82
 In contrast, a cellphone or 
a digital camera is sold today for a fraction of price that it used to cost in the past.
83
 
 While this new technology comes with many benefits, now citizens can record police 
misconduct at sight whenever needed. That will add pressure on police officers to conduct their 
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duties in a civilized and disciplined way. Moreover, police officers that are being falsely accused 
of bad conduct can be protected through the use of recordings. As the court in ACLU v. Alvarez
84
 
said, “Civilian recordings of police can help resolve police-civilian factual disputes regarding, 
for example, threats, verbal abuse, racial harassment, whether an officer Mirandized a civilian 
before interrogating him, whether police encouraged one civilian to threaten another, and 
whether force was excessive.” It is unquestionable that a recording of an encounter can provide 
many benefits to police officers. Usual testimonial problems that are always an issue in court are 
simply gone as long as the recording is admitted. For example, a police officer’s testimony may 
fall or the officer is being accused of the testimony falling under any of those categories: (1) 
Faulty memory; (2) Bias; and (3) Any misstatement as to how the incident took place. 
A video recording could fix all of those issues by showing what actually took place, and 
it would help the jury reach an unbiased decision based on the incident itself; if a photo is worth 
a thousand words, a recording is worth a million.  Recordings like that have already helped 
numerous officers to be exonerated from allegations of misconduct.
85
 Recordings of police 
officers can also help educate other police officials on how to deal with specific situations; a 
recording can show the inexperienced police officer how to properly deal with a unique situation. 
 While we see how there are many benefits of having better technology, there are also 
matters that citizens need to be careful of when it comes to new technology. The ACLU has 
invented an application for smart phones to secretly record police officers. The application called 
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“Police Tape”86 can lead to problems with the current laws of today. For example, if a citizen 
uses the application to record an encounter with a police officer in Massachusetts, that could lead 
to an arrest
87
 as it is illegal to secretly record a police officer; by the same token, it is legal to 
record a police officer in an indiscreet way. 
 
D. Police Officer’s Expectation of Privacy 
As previously noted in Katz, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against state and 
federal actors, but the Fourth Amendment does little to protect police officers, and an expectation 
of privacy provided to citizens, is often not found for police officers.
88
 States such as 
Massachusetts that do not provide an expectation of privacy exception, might want to consider 
defining expectation of privacy for both citizens and police officers. That way, with the rising 
number cases which citizens record police officers, there will not be an issue when those rights 
are violated. 
 In O’Brien v. DiGrazia89, the courts when questioned with the issue of whether police 
officers’ expectation of privacy or the public interested should outweigh each other found that 
the public interest was more important than a police officer’s expectation of privacy. It is a 
known fact that reducing privacy holds police officers more accountable, and that is one of the 
factors that is necessary to protect the public against illegitimate exercise of power.
90
 
 Besides the first issue, there is also the concern of what are the circumstances that give 
                                                             
86 http://www.aclu-nj.org/yourrights/the-app-place/ 
87 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 §99(B)(4) 
88
 Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 Md. L. Rev. 600, 609-10 (2009), 
89  O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976). 
90 State v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 972 (2001) (Marshall, C.J. dissenting). 
30 
 
rise to this expectation of privacy of police officers and if they in fact should even possess such a 
right. This focus in changing language to appropriately define to whom the expectation of 
privacy may be granted should mainly focus in states where there is an all-party consent like 
Massachusetts. 
E. Illinois Lack of Privacy Provision 
Illinois is the only state that considers it a crime to record conversations regardless of 
privacy expectations.
91
 Illinois also requires all parties consent to record.
92
There is no concrete 
theory of an expectation of privacy in Illinois, as it acts without any subjective or objective 
expectation of privacy. Unlike Massachusetts, Illinois also disregards whether the recording was 
made in the secretly or out in the open. All in all, the only possible way to not violate the Illinois 
Wiretap Act is to have the consent of all parties to the recording, regardless of where you are. 
This can prove to be a difficult task when conducting recordings in an open park, or places with 
several people. For example, if someone is at a stadium filled with fans and players, technically, 
that person would have to gather the consent from every single person that is attending the event, 
and that is playing. It is clear to see how the Illinois Wiretap Act is problematic, as it is too strict, 
and at the same time, too broad in its statutory language without providing an expectation of 
privacy that all citizens deserve. Moreover, the Act misses the point and direction for which the 
statute was created; while making it a requirement to have all parties consent, it makes it almost 
impossible in several different occasions to have a lawful recording.
93
 The Illinois court’s intent 
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had at its core the desire to “protect individuals from unwarranted invasions of privacy…. and 
safeguard citizens from unnecessary governmental surveillance.”94 But instead, it is 
criminalizing as a felony. The action of a number of innocent people whose conduct has no 
bearing on any privacy expectation. 
With the Supreme Court’s decision in ACLU v. Alvarez to uphold the lower court’s95 
decision, it is very likely that we will see a new amendment to the Illinois Wiretap Act, one that 
serves as it was intended, to protect its citizens from unnecessary governmental surveillance. 
One good example is in Graber, where Graber was recording a police officer in an area that there 
would be no reasonable expectation of privacy; however, because Illinois is so strict in its 
consent requirement, it led to an arrest that would have not happened in any other state. Another 
example, in Allison, the incident happened in circumstances in which there would be no 
expectation of privacy; it was an open recording of police officers on duty on a civilian’s 
property, and the hearing took place in a busy courthouse. 
96
 Again, because Allison never 
acquired their consent, this conduct was considered a crime that would be lawful in any other 
state, aside from Massachusetts.  
F. The Need for a Privacy Provision 
Illinois and Massachusetts Wiretapping statutes are stricter than the wiretapping statutes of 
any other state. Still, both of those statutes were made with the intent to protect private citizens 
from state actors and other citizens.
97
The intent was never to prosecute citizens recording police 
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officers.
98
 Both of those states could be accomplishing their original intent for if they provided 
provision for a conversation made with a reasonable expectation of privacy. In cases like Graber, 
Allison, and Hyde, to name a few, there would be no violation the police officer recording would 
not be prohibited because it will not have the been made with a reasonable expectation of privacy 
– as contained in the Federal Act. The ability to record police officers should be allowed, as the 
First Amendment allows the ability to gather information, and deliver information. This 
information that can be crucial in cases such as the one involving Rodney King. A police officer 
should not be shielded from recordings, as there is an ongoing need to monitor police officers 
and hold them accountable for their actions. Therefore, by allowing recording when a reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not exist, citizens will be able to record on-duty officers in public, 
the recording would not conflict with police officers’ investigations because they would only be 
recorded in settings where there is not an expectation of privacy. 
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III. Proposal 
Consumer technology is always advancing, and the legal issues in states like 
Massachusetts and Illinois need to be looked at by both legislatures and the courts. There are 
numerous ways that the statutes from Massachusetts and Illinois that lack of an expectation 
privacy language can be dealt with to not be unconstitutional.  
A clear solution would be to simply amend the statute to protect only those face-to-face 
conversations made with a reasonable expectation of privacy similar to the Federal Wiretap 
Act. Including such a provision would be the easiest way to fix any issues surrounding those 
statutes – as the other states do not have such a problem with those statutes. By doing so, there 
would no conflict citizens’ rights. Police officers would still be able to conduct investigations 
as they deem necessary without risking premature investigations to be aborted because of 
unwanted recordings, since all recordings would happen in a public place, where a police 
officer would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place. It would also grant 
citizens the ability to monitor police activity, so that there is a lesser incidence of police 
misconduct. This would also be beneficial to police officers as they would be able to also use 
recordings in their advantage when faced with false allegations by citizens. The court system 
would also benefit from this, as an accurate recording would save court is time, and lead to a 
fair and correct judgment in cases of which there is a recording.  
 
 
 
